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Randomness amplification is the task of transforming a source of somewhat random bits
into a source of fully random bits. Although it is impossible to amplify randomness from a
single source by classical means, the situation is different considering non-local correlations
allowed by quantum mechanics. Here we give the first device-independent protocol for
randomness amplification using a constant number of devices. The protocol involves four
devices, can amplify any non-deterministic source into a fully random source, tolerates a
constant rate of error, and has its correctness based solely on the assumption of no-signaling
between the devices. In contrast all previous protocols either required an unbounded num-
ber of devices, or could only amplify sources sufficiently close to fully random.
I. INTRODUCTION
Randomness is a useful resource in a variety of applications, ranging from numerical simu-
lations to cryptography. However, almost always one needs ideal or close to ideal randomness,
while typical random sources are far from ideal. Randomness amplification, defined as a process
that maps a source of randomness into another closer to an ideal source, is a potential solution to
this problem. But is randomness amplification possible at all?
We model a source of randomness as an ε-Santha-Vazirani source (ε-SV source), given by a
probability distribution p(α1, . . . , αn) over bit strings such that, for every i ≤ n,
1
2
− ε ≤ p(αi|α1, . . . , αi−1) ≤ 1
2
+ ε. (1)
The previous equation is the only assumption on the source, which otherwise can be arbitrary.
Given an ε-SV source, is it possible to process the bits so that the quality of the randomness
is improved? In particular, can we obtain a fully random bit by processing an arbitrary large
number of bits from any ε-SV source? Santha and Vazirani answered the question in the negative
[1]: It is impossible to improve the quality of the randomness of SV sources 1. However, their
argument only applies to classical protocols and it leaves open the possibility that the situation
might be different once quantum resources are considered.
Indeed, it is trivial to generate randomness in quantum mechanics, e.g. by preparing a pure
state and measuring it in a complementary basis. However, this assumes that one has full control
1 Similar results are also known for other different sources of randomness [2].
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2of the state preparation and the measurement. A more demanding task is to generate random-
ness in a device independent manner, treating the quantum system as a black-box and obtaining
randomness only as a consequence of the correlations in measurement outcomes and fundamen-
tal physical principles such as the no-signaling principle. The existence of non-local quantum
correlations violating Bell inequalities already suggests that device-independent randomness am-
plification could be achieved. However, the violation of Bell inequalities requires that the mea-
surements be performed in a random manner, independent of the system upon which they are
performed [3, 4].
In a seminal work [5], Colbeck and Renner showed that despite this difficulty non-local quan-
tum correlations can be used to amplify the randomness of Santha-Vazirani sources that are suf-
ficiently close to fully random. This result was later improved by Gallego et al. [7], who gave
a protocol using quantum non-local correlations to amplify general SV sources, as long as they
are not deterministic. Neither of the two protocols tolerate noise however. In [8], we gave a differ-
ent protocol that is robust to noise and can transform any non-deterministic SV source into a fully
random one. A major drawback of the protocols in [7, 8] is that they require an infinite number of
space-like separated devices. Therefore a natural open question is the existence of a randomness
amplification protocol using a fixed number of devices, on the one hand, and allowing for the am-
plification of arbitrary non-deterministic SV sources, on the other hand. See also [10–13, 15–18]
for more recent work in the area.
A related, but distinct, task to randomness amplification is device-independent randomness
expansion, where one assumes that a seed of perfect random bits is available and the goal is to
expand it into a larger random bit string. Quantum non-locality has found application also in this
latter task [19, 22–26, 33, 35], as well as in device-independent quantum key-distribution (see e.g.
[27, 31, 32, 34]).
A. Results
In this paper we overcome the shortcomings of previous protocols and obtain:
Theorem 1 (informal). For every ε < 12 , there is a protocol using an ε-SV source and four no-signaling
devices with the following properties:
• Using the devices poly(n, log(1/δ)) times, the protocol either aborts or produces n bits which are
δ-close to uniform and independent of any side information (e.g. held by an adversary).
• Local measurements on many copies of a four-partite entangled state, with poly(1 − 2ε) error rate,
give rise to devices that do not abort the protocol with probability larger than 1− 2−Ω(n).
An important assumption in the theorem above is that the SV source is independent of the
joint device shared by the honest parties and adversary (see Sec. III for details). The theorem is
based on Protocol I, given in Fig. 1 , using the four-partite Bell inequality given in Section II B. See
Theorem 20 in Section V for a precise formulation of the theorem.
Theorem 1 has the drawback that the extractor used in Protocol 1 is non-explicit (we only
know that it exists by the probabilistic method). We can improve on this aspect if we are willing
to increase the number of no-signaling devices and worsen the efficiency of the protocol with the
output error.
Theorem 2 (informal). For every ε < 12 , there is a protocol using an ε-SV source and eight no-signaling
devices with the following properties:
3• Using the devices poly(n, 1/δ) times, the protocol either aborts or produces n bits which are δ-close
to uniform and independent of any side information (e.g. held by an adversary).
• Local measurements on many copies of a four-partite entangled state, with poly(1 − 2ε) error rate,
give rise to devices that do not abort the protocol with probability larger than 1− 2−Ω(n).
The protocol is fully explicit and runs in poly(n, 1/δ) time.
The protocol is given in Fig. 3. Its proof of correctness is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1,
with a new ingredient that we show how to simulate two independent sources selecting subsys-
tems at random (applying an analogue of the de Finetti Theorem of [36] to subsystems selected
by a SV source). The advantage of this new step is that we have three independent sources and
so can use known explicit and computationally efficient extractors.
B. Features of the Protocols and Comparison with Previous Works
In this section we compare our result with similar work in the area. The main protocols for
randomness amplification proposed so far are summarized in Table I. There are several aspects of
a protocol for randomness amplification to be considered:
• Source-Device Correlations: In this paper (as in [5, 7]) we assume that the device shared
by the honest parties and Eve is independent of the imperfect randomness source2. A less
demanding requirement is to require only that the source has randomness conditioned on
the devices 3.
• Number of Devices: This is the total number of different no-signalling devices that are
used in the protocol. For a protocol to be practical, it must involve only a small constant
number of devices.
• Robustness: This is the amount of error per basic element that the protocol can withstand
while still working correctly. A basic element is either a two-qubit gate, a qubit measure-
ment, or the storage of one qubit for one time step. For the protocol to be practical it must
tolerate a constant amount of noise per basic element.
• Eavesdropper: This represents the type of adversary under which the protocol is secure. It
can be either a quantum adversary or a more powerful no-signalling adversary.
• Composability: This represents whether the protocol is composable (being secure even if
Eve measures her part of the device after learning some of the output random bits).
• Source: Two types of sources have been considered so far: Santha-Vazirani sources and the
less demanding min-entropy sources (where one only requires that the source has a certain
amount of min-entropy).
2 The analogous classical problem would be that one wishes to extract fully random bits from a weak source of ran-
domness and an unknown channel. While this is clearly impossible, the situation is different when one considers
non-local correlations.
3 This is the assumption considered in the work of Chung, Shi, and Wu [13] discussed below.
4Source-Device
Correlations
# Devices Robustness Eve Comp. Source Public
Source
Run time
Colbeck-
Renner [5]
indep. 2 1poly(m) NS no SV
ε < .08
yes poly( 1δ ,m)
Gallego et al [7] indep. poly( 1δ ,m)
1
poly(m) NS yes SV yes 2
poly(log 1δ ,m)
This Paper
Protocol I
indep. 4 Ω(1− 2ε) NS yes SV no 2poly(log 1δ ,m)
This Paper
Protocol II
indep. 8 Ω(1− 2ε) NS yes SV no poly( 1δ ,m)
Chung-Shi-Wu [12] positive cond.
min-entropy
poly( 1δ ) Ω(1) Q yes Hmin yes poly(log
1
δ ,m)
Mironowicz-
Pawlowski * [10]
indep. 2 Ω(1) Q no SV no poly(log 1δ ,m)
Bouda et al * [14] positive
min-entropy
3 1poly(m) Q no Hmin yes poly(log
1
δ ,m)
TABLE I: Comparison of protocols for randomness amplification. In the table we used: 1) m : number of
output bits; 2) δ: distance from uniform of output bits; 3) NS and Q stands for no-signaling and quantum
adversaries, respectively. black indicates less demanding assumptions/better parameters, while red indicates
more depanding assumptions/worse parameters. *The protocols proposed in [10] and [14] were not given a
full security proof so far.
• Public Source: This item makes a distinction between the way the bits of the random source
are distributed. In a public source the bits are drawn from the source and then communi-
cated to all the parties (including Eve). In a private source, the honest parties have exclusive
access to a part of the source, and the eavesdropper only learn about the bits in this part
from her correlations with the other parts of the source under the adversary’s control.
• Run Time: This item quantifies the computational complexity of the protocol.
In addition to the two protocols analysed in this paper, several other interesting protocols
with complementary advantages have been proposed. Apart from the work of Colbeck and Ren-
ner [5] and Gallego et al [7] discussed in the introduction, another interesting protocol was pro-
posed by Chung, Shi, and Wu [12] (after the first version of this paper appeared). Their protocol
is sound against quantum adversaries and can amplify the randomness of every min-entropy
source. Moreover it has the distinguishing feature that the correct functioning of the protocol
is guaranteed based only on the source having positive min-entropy conditioned on the (quan-
tum) state of the devices. A drawback of the protocol is that it requires an unbounded number of
devices.
Another interesting development was the work of Coudron and Yuen [13], who shown that
any composable protocol can be made to have infinity rate (at the cost of increasing the number
of devices by two) and decreasing the robustness. Combining their result with ours one obtains a
protocol whose rate is infinite (the number of bits from the SV source only determines the output
error).
C. Protocols and Outline of their Proofs of Correctness
Protocol I is simpler than the previous protocols [5, 7, 8]. It is given precisely in Fig. 1 and
illustrated in Fig. 2, but its rough structure is the following: First, one uses several bits from the
5Protocol I
1. The ε-SV source is used to choose the measurement settings u1≤n for the single device. The device
produces output bits x1≤n.
2. The parties perform an estimation of the violation of the Bell inequality in the device by computing
the empirical average Ln := 1n
∑n
i=1B(xi, ui). The protocol is aborted unless Ln ≤ δ (for δ > 0 is
a constant depending only on ).
3. Conditioned on not aborting in the previous step, the parties apply the extractor from part (i) of
Lemma 5 to the sequence of outputs from the device and further n bits from the ε-SV source.
FIG. 1: Protocol for device-independent randomness amplification from a single (four-partite) device with
non-explicit extractor.
Santha-Vazirani source in order to choose inputs for four no-signaling boxes (each of which is
reused many times). Then, one collects the outputs of the boxes and using the empirical data on
inputs and outputs decides whether to abort. Then if the protocol is not aborted, one applies a
randomness extractor (see Sec. II A) to all output bits of the four devices and to a further set of
bits taken from the SV source. The output bits of the protocol, which by Theorem 1 are close to
fully random, are just the output bits of the extractor.
The proof of correctness of the protocol consists of three main steps.
(i) We show that by increasing the output error of the protocol (and the assumption that the
source is private) it suffices to prove the security of the protocol considering an adversary
that only has classical side-information about the devices of the honest parties. This is
achieved in Section III.
(i) We show that, conditioned on passing a certain test on the input and output of the four no-
signaling boxes, with high probability over the given input, the output is a source of linear
min-entropy. This is achieved in Proposition 19.
(iii) We use know results on extractors for two independent sources.
Step (ii) is established by a sequence of implications (which have a similar flavor to the estima-
tion of [22–24] for the related task of randomness expansion) as follows:
• In Sec. IV A we present an estimation procedure which ensures that with high probability
the value of the Bell expression with settings chosen from a SV source is small 4 for a linear
fraction of boxes conditioned on previous inputs and outputs. This will follow from an
simple application of Azuma’s inequality.
• In Sec. IV B we show that a small value of the Bell value with settings chosen from a SV
source implies that for any setting the probability of any output is bounded away from one.
This is achieved by solving a linear-program, analogously to the approach of [7, 8].
• In Sec. IV C, in turn, we show that if a constant fraction of conditional boxes has prob-
ability of outputs bounded away from one, then, given the input, the output has linear
min-entropy.
4 The Bell inequality we consider is such that the maximum possible violation corresponds to the zero value. Thus the
smaller the Bell value, the larger the violation.
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FIG. 2: Illustration of the protocol for randomness amplification from a single device (of four no-signaling
parts) of n runs by using a non-explicit randomness extractor.
Step (iii) is an application of known results regarding extracting randomness from two inde-
pendent min-entropy sources (see Sec. II A). They say, that one can extract randomness from two
or more independent min-entropy sources. In our case the independence follows from our main
assumption saying that device is independent of the SV source.
It is instructive to point out already here where the non-local nature of our protocol plays a
role. It is in the second step that the non-local nature of correlations is exploited. There, looking
at the inputs and outputs of the devices obtained, one can verify in a device-independent manner
that the outputs must have been somewhat random. This is impossible classically without making
further assumptions.
Protocol II: In the scenario where we require an explicit extractor (Protocol II described in Fig. 3
and illustrated in Fig. 4), a further set of four no-signaling boxes is taken into account. As before,
bits from the SV source are input into these boxes and a test is performed on the empirical data of
inputs and outputs. In this case, the randomness extractor is applied to the output bits of all eight
no-signaling devices and a further set of bits from the SV source.
The proof of security of Protocol II is contained in Sec. VI, with the main result stated in Theo-
rem 27. We need here an extra step to reduce the problem to having three independent sources of
week randomness. Namely we show that we can effectively work with two independent devices
7Protocol II
1. The ε-SV source is used to choose the measurement settings u1≤M1 , u
2
≤M2 for the 2 devices. The
devices produce output bits x1≤M1 , x
2
≤M2 .
2. The measurements in device j (for j = 1, 2) are partitioned into Nj blocks of boxes each containing
n boxes (so that Mj = nNj).
3. The parties choose at random one block of boxes of size n from each device, using bits from the ε-SV
source.
4. The parties perform an estimation of the violation of the Bell inequality in the chosen block from
each of the two devices by computing the empirical average Ljn :=
1
n
∑n
i=1B(x
j
i , u
j
i ). The protocol
is aborted unless for both of them, Ljn ≤ δ.
5. Conditioned on not aborting in the previous step, the parties apply the extractor from part (ii) of
Lemma 5 to the sequence of outputs from the chosen block in each device.
FIG. 3: Protocol for device-independent randomness amplification from two (four-partite) devices with an
explicit, and efficient, extractor.
(of four no-signaling parts each); by independent we mean devices that, given any fixed inputs,
produce uncorrelated outputs.
The idea is to adapt recent de Finetti theorems for no-signaling devices [36, 37] (based on
information-theoretical methods) to the situation in which subsystems are selected from a Santha-
Vazirani source, instead of being selected uniformly at random. In Lemma 13 we show that given
two no-signaling devices, if we select at random (using a SV source) a block of uses from the
second device among a sufficiently large number of blocks, this block of will be approximately
uncorrelated with the first device.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Randomness Extractors
Recall the definition of a min-entropy source:
Definition 3 (The min-entropy source). The min-entropy of a random variable S is given by
Hmin(S) = min
s∈supp(S)
log
1
P (S = s)
. (2)
When S ∈ {0, 1}n, it is called an (n,Hmin(S)).
From multiple weak sources of randomness, one can use independent source extractors [6] to
extract nearly uniform random bits.
Definition 4 (Independent-source extractor). An independent source extractor is a function Ext :
({0, 1}n)k → {0, 1}m that acting on k independent (n,Hmin(S)) sources, outputs m bits which are ξ-
close to uniform, i.e. for k independent (n,Hmin(S)) sources S1, . . . , Sk we have
‖Ext(S1, . . . , Sk)− Um‖1 ≤ ξ, (3)
where ‖.‖1 is the variational distance between the two distributions and Um denotes the uniform distribu-
tion on the m bits.
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FIG. 4: Illustration of the protocol for randomness amplification from two devices (of four no-signaling parts
each) with N1 = 1 block of n runs from the first device and N2 blocks of n runs from the second.
The results about extractors that we will use are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 5 (Extractors Constructions).
(i) [2] There exists a (non-explicit) deterministic extractor that, given two independent sources of min-
entropy larger than h, outputs Ω(h) bits 2−Ω(h)-close to uniform.
(ii) [21] There exists an explicit extractor that given three independent sources, one having min-entropy
larger than τn (for any τ > 0) and the other two larger than h ≥ logc(n) (with c > 0 a universal
constant), outputs Ω(h) bits 2−hΩ(1)-close to uniform.The extractor can be implemented in time
poly(n, h).
When we say the first extractor is non-explicit we mean that its existence is only guaranteed
by the probabilistic method.
Theorem 1 uses the non-explicit extractor for two sources stated in part (i), while Theorem 2
uses Rao’s extractor [21] stated in part (ii).
9B. The Bell inequality
The inequality we consider involves four spatially separated parties with measurement set-
tings u = {u1,u2,u3,u4} and respective outcomes x = {x1, x2, x3, x4}. Each party chooses one
of two measurement settings with two outcomes each so that ui ∈ {0, 1} and xi ∈ {0, 1} for
i ∈ {1, .., 4}. The measurement settings for which non-trivial constraints are imposed by the in-
equality can be divided into two sets
U0 = {{0001}, {0010}, {0100}, {1000}} and U1 = {{0111}, {1011}, {1101}, {1110}}. (4)
The inequality is then [9]∑
x,u
(I⊕4i=1xi=0 Iu∈U0 + I⊕4i=1xi=1 Iu∈U1) P (x|u) ≥ 2, (5)
where the indicator function IL = 1 if L is true and 0 otherwise. The local hidden variable bound
is 2 and there exist no-signaling distributions that reach the algebraic limit of 0. For any no-
signaling box represented by a vector of probabilities {P (x|u)}, the Bell inequality may be written
as
B.{P (x|u)} =
∑
x,u
B(x,u)P (x|u) ≥ 2, (6)
where B is an indicator vector for the Bell inequality with 24 × 24 entries
B(x,u) = I⊕4i=1xi=0 Iu∈U0 + I⊕4i=1xi=1 Iu∈U1 . (7)
Consider the quantum state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|φ−〉|φ˜+〉+ |ψ+〉|ψ˜−〉), (8)
where |φ−〉 = 1√2(|0〉|0〉 − |1〉|1〉), |ψ+〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|1〉 + |1〉|0〉), |φ˜+〉 = 1√2(|0〉|+〉 + |1〉|−〉), and
|ψ˜−〉 = 1√2(|0〉|−〉 − |1〉|+〉). Measurements in the X basis
{|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)} (9)
correspond to ui = 0 and measurements in the Z basis
{|0〉, |1〉} (10)
correspond to ui = 1 for each of the four parties i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. These measurements on |Ψ〉
lead to the algebraic violation of the inequality, i.e., the sum of the probabilities appearing in the
inequality is zero.
The reason for the choice of this Bell inequality is twofold. Firstly, as we have seen, there
exist quantum correlations achieving the maximal no-signaling violation of the inequality, which
implies that free randomness amplification starting from any initial ε of the SV source may be
possible. Secondly, we will show (in Lemma 11) that, for any measurement setting u out of the 24
possible settings in the inequality, the probability of any of the 24 output bit strings x is bounded
away from one (for any no-signaling box) by a linear function of the uniform value of the Bell
expression.
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III. GENERAL SET-UP, ASSUMPTIONS, AND RANDOMNESS CRITERION
We have the following general setup. We consider the variable sv from the SV-source and the
box held by the honest parties and Eve. The devices held by the honest parties have input and
output denoted by in and out and Eve’s input and output are denoted inE and outE , respectively.
The devices held by the honest parties are separated into m components with corresponding
inputs and outputs ini and outi for i ∈ [m]; furthermore, for each device component we have l
sequential runs with inputs and outputs denoted by inik and out
i
k for k ∈ [l], respectively. The
variable sv is divided into three parts (svE , sv1, sv2), where svE is generated by Eve, while sv1
and sv2 are generated by the honest parties. The variables sv1 will be used as inputs to devices.
The honest parties will check whether out and in satisfy some joint acceptance condition
(based on the violation of a particular Bell inequality); this acceptance event is denoted by ACC.
Conditioned on acceptance, the variables sv2 together with the outputs out of devices will be
hashed (using a multi-source extractor) to produce the output s - the output random bits. The
variables sv1 and sv2 as well as the outputs out of the devices will be destroyed in the protocol
(and in particular will remain hidden from Eve).
The initial state of the system will be defined as the following correlation box:
p(out, outE , sv1, sv2, svE |in, inE) (11)
We assume the following:
• No-signaling assumptions: The box satisfies the constraint of no-signaling between the
honest parties and Eve
p(out|in, inE) = p(out|in),
p(outE |in, inE) = p(outE |inE), (12)
as well as a no-signaling condition between device components
p(outI |in) = p(outI |inI) ∀I ⊆ [m]. (13)
Each device component also obeys a time-ordered no-signaling (tons) condition for the
k ∈ [l] runs performed on it:
p(outik|outE , ini, inE , sv) = p(outik|outE , ini≤k, inE , sv) ∀k ∈ [l] (14)
where ini≤k := in
i
1, . . . , in
i
k.
• SV conditions: The variables (sv1, sv2, svE) form an SV source, that is satisfy Eq. (1). In
particular, (sv2|sv1, svE) is also an SV source.
• Assumption A1: The devices do not signal to the SV source, i.e. the distribution of sv is
independent of the inputs (in, inE):∑
out,outE
p(out, outE , sv|in, inE) = p(sv) ∀(out, outE , sv, in, inE). (15)
• Assumption A2: The box is fixed independently of the SV source:
p(out, outE |in, inE , sv) = p(out, outE |in, inE) ∀(out, outE , sv, in, inE). (16)
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Assumption A1 is not v ery restrictive and is required to meaningfully describe the process of
inputting a variable from the SV source into the box. Assumption (A2), in turn, is more restrictive,
although in our view is still a natural one. It is the quantum analogue of the problem of extracting
randomness from one source and an independent (but unknown and arbitrary) channel. While it
is easy to see that no randomness can be extracted in this classical setting, the situation is different
considering non-local correlations. This assumption was also employed in the pioneering results
[5, 7, 10], as well as in all other results on the topic apart from [12].
After sv1 is input as in, we obtain the following box,
p(out, outE , sv1, sv2, svE |inE) := p(out, outE , sv1, sv2, svE |sv1, inE) (17)
Due to assumption A1, which assures in particular no-signaling from in to sv1, this is a normal-
ized probability distribution.
Conditioning on acceptance ACC and applying a hash function s(out, sv2), one gets the fol-
lowing box
r(s, outE , svE |inE) := p(s, outE , svE |inE ,ACC)
≡
∑
sv1
∑
s(out,sv2)=s
p(out, outE , sv1, sv2, svE , |inE ,ACC) (18)
where
p(out, outE , sv1, sv2, svE |inE ,ACC) = p(out, outE , sv1, sv2, svE |inE)∑
(out,sv1)∈ACC p(out, sv1|inE)
(19)
The composable security criterion [28, 29] is defined in terms of the distance of
r(s, outE , svE |inE) to an ideal box rid = 1|S|r(outE , svE |inE), with r(outE , svE |inE) =∑
s r(s, outE , svE |inE). The distance is the standard variational distance between probability
distributions maximized over all possible measurements applied to the box. Since the most gen-
eral measurement that Eve can apply is to look at the register svE , as well as the register s, and
input inE that may depend on both of them, we have:
dc =
∑
s,svE
max
inE
∑
outE
∣∣∣∣r(s, outE , svE |inE)− 1|S|r(outE , svE |inE)
∣∣∣∣ . (20)
One can rewrite it as follows
dc =
∑
s,svE
max
inE
∑
outE
r(outE , svE |inE)
∣∣∣∣r(s|outE , svE , inE)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ (21)
Rewriting it in terms of the box p we obtain
dc =
∑
s,svE
max
inE
∑
outE
p(outE , svE |inE ,ACC)
∣∣∣∣p(s|outE , svE , inE ,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ . (22)
The composable secure definition says that the protocol is ε-secure if dc ≤ ε, for a chosen error ε.
It guarantees that even if part of s is given to Eve, the rest is still secure.
We now note that
dc ≤ |S|
∑
svE
max
inE
∑
outE
p(outE , svE |inE ,ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣p(s|outE , svE , inE ,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ . (23)
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In our proofs we will use this estimate and therefore will have to handle the extra factor of the
size of the output |S| in the error. The benefit will be that one can fix the measurement of Eve
beforehand. In particular this allows us to use an extractor sound only with respect to a classical
adversary and nevertheless obtain security under a no-signaling adversary.
We note that assuming Eve is quantum, in other problems such as quantum key distribution
and randomness expansion, it is possible to avoid the increase of the output error by |S| using
extractors that are sound against quantum side-information. The fact that an extractor that out-
puts n bits with error ε sound against classical side information is also sound against quantum
(or even no-signaling) side information with error 2nε is well known (see e.g. [30]). However
in many applications this error blow up is prohibitive. It turns out that in our approach we can
afford it by tracing out a large fraction of the number of output bits.
IV. TOOLS FOR RANDOMNESS AMPLIFICATION
In this section we give the tools we will employ proving the correctness of Protocols I and II.
A. Estimation of the Bell value
In this section we first show, that with high probability, the arithmetic average of mean values
for conditional boxes is close to the observed value. As a corollary, we obtain that if the average
is small, then with high probability for a linear fraction of all boxes the mean will be small too. It
has a similar flavor to previous results [22–24] obtained in the context of the related problem of
randomness expansion.
Remark 6. In the proof of Protocol I the variables Wi will be interpreted as Wi = (xi, ui), for i ≥ 1, where
any xi and ui are of the form of x = (x1, . . . , x4) and u = (u1, . . . ,u4), respectively, both introduced in
Subsection II B, and W0 = (z, e). As far as we consider the general set-up described in Sec. III, we just put
out := xi, in := ui, outE := z and inE := e (see Sec. V for details).
As for Protocol II, the lemma will be applied twice. For the first time, we will takeWi = (xi, ui) for i ≥ 1
and W0 = (z, vj ,Mj , e). For the second time, we will take Wi = (y
j
i , v
j
i ) for i ≥ 1 and W0 = (z, u,Mj , e)
(see Sec. VI for the definitions of all variables used above).
The function Bi will be the same for both those cases, and for all i ≥ 1, given by (7).
Lemma 7. Consider arbitrary random variables Wi, for i = 0, 1, . . . , n, and binary random variables
Bi, for i = 1, . . . n, that are functions of Wi, i.e. Bi = fi(Wi) for some functions fi. Let us denote
Bi = E(Bi|Wi−1, . . . ,W1,W0), for i = 1, . . . , n (i.e. Bi are conditional expectation values). Define, for
k = 1, . . . , n, the empirical average
Lk =
1
k
k∑
i=1
Bi (24)
and the arithmetic average of conditional expectation values
Lk =
1
k
k∑
i=1
Bi. (25)
Then we have
P (|Ln − Ln| ≥ s) ≤ 2e−n s
2
2 . (26)
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To prove lemma 7, we need to state the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. Let X0, . . . , Xk and
W0, . . . ,Wk be two sequences of random variables. Then X0, . . . , Xk is said to be a martingale
with respect to W0, . . . ,Wk if for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, E|Xi| <∞ and E(Xi|W0, . . . ,Wi−1) = Xi−1.
Lemma 8. (Azuma-Hoeffding) Suppose X0, . . . , Xk is a martingale with respect to W0, . . . ,Wk, and that
|Xl+1 −Xl| ≤ cl for all 0 ≤ l ≤ k − 1. Then, for all positive reals t,
P (|Xk −X0| ≥ t) ≤ 2 exp
(
− t
2
2
∑k
l=1 c
2
l
)
. (27)
Now we can prove Lemma 7.
Proof. Define X0 = 0, Xl = l(Ll − Ll). Let us show that {Xi}ni=0 and {Wi}ni=0 satisfy the assump-
tions of Lemma 8. First,
|Xl −Xl−1| = |Bl −Bl| ≤ 1, (28)
since Bl is binary and 0 ≤ Bl ≤ 1. Let us now check that {Xl}nl=0 is a martingale with respect to
{Wl}n−1i=0 . We have E|Xl| ≤ l <∞. Moreover, for l ≥ 2 we have
E(Xl|Wl−1, . . . ,W0) =
l∑
i=1
E(Bi|Wl−1, . . . ,W0)−
l∑
i=1
E(Bi|Wl−1, . . . ,W0) (29)
=
l∑
i=1
E(Bi|Wl−1, . . . ,W0)−
l∑
i=1
Bi (30)
=
l−1∑
i=1
E(Bi|Wl−1, . . . ,W0)−
l−1∑
i=1
Bi (31)
where we used the property
E(E(A|B)|BC) = E(A|B) (32)
for random variables A,B,C. Now let us note that since Bi is a function of Wi, we get for i ≤ l−1
E(Bi|Wl−1, . . . ,W1,W0) = Bi (33)
Thus the last line of Eq. (31) is equal to Xl−1, so that we have
E(Xl|Wl−1, . . . ,W1,W0) = Xl−1 (34)
for l = 2, . . . , n. For l = 1 one may verify Eq.(34) by checking directly that E(X1|W0) = 0,
being hence equal to X0 defined to be zero. Indeed, in the latter case X1 = B1 − B1 where
B1 = E(B1|W0), hence using (32) we get E(B1 − B1|W0) = E(B1|W0) − E(E(B1|W0)|W0) = 0.
Now, we apply Lemma 8 with cl = 1, and obtain the inequality (26). uunionsq
We also note the following useful fact.
Lemma 9. If the arithmetic average Ln of n conditional means in Eq.(25) satisfies Ln ≤ δ for some
parameter δ > 0, then in at least (1−√δ)n of positions i we have Bi ≤
√
δ
Proof. Assume that Ln = 1n
∑n
i=1Bi ≤ δ with Bi ≥ 0 ∀i. Consider the set I := {i|Bi ≥ δγ }. Then,
|I|
n
δ
γ ≤ δ so that |I| ≤ nγ. Choosing γ =
√
δ we obtain that the fraction µ of positions i with value
Bi <
√
δ is given by µ = (1− |I|n ) ≥ 1−
√
δ. uunionsq
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B. Randomness of individual box from good Bell value
In Sec. IV A we have shown that if the observed Bell value is small, then there is linear number
of conditional boxes, with small Bell value (with settings chosen from a SV source). In Sec. IV C we
will show that in order to obtain a min-entropy source we need to ensure that a constant fraction
of the conditional boxes has randomness. In this section we will tie up the two observations by
arguing that the randomness of a box is ensured if the value of the Bell expression with inputs
taken from a SV source is small.
Let U denote all the settings appearing in the Bell expression. We consider first the uniform
Bell value
B
U
:=
1
|U|B.{P (x|u)} =
1
|U|
∑
x,u
B(x,u)P (x|u), (35)
where |U| denotes the cardinality of U , i.e. the total number of settings in the Bell expression. If
the Bell function B(x,u) is properly chosen, one can prove using linear programming that if BU
is small, the probabilities of any outputs are bounded away from 1. However, since our inputs
to each device are chosen using a SV source, we will be only able to estimate the value of the
following expression
B
SV
=
∑
x,u
ν(u)B(x,u)P (x|u), (36)
where ν(u) is the distribution from an (unknown) SV source. We will show that for a suitably
chosen Bell function, when the latter expression is small, the former is also small which implies
randomness.
In the following lemma, we prove the relation between SV Bell value and randomness for
a particular Bell inequality given by Eq. (5). It says that for SV source of arbitrary ε 6= 12 , if the SV
Bell value is small enough, the probability of any outcome is bounded away from 1.
Lemma 10. Consider a four-partite no-signaling box P (x|u) satisfying
B
SV ≤ δ, (37)
where BSV is given by Eq. (36) with B(x,u) given by Eq. (7). Then, for any measurement setting u∗ and
any output x∗, we have
P (x∗|u∗) ≤ 1
3
(
1 +
2δ
(12 − )4
)
. (38)
Proof. From the definition of an ε-SV source we have
(
1
2
− ε)4 ≤ ν(u) ≤ (1
2
+ ε)4. (39)
so that
1
(12 + ε)
4|U|B
SV ≤ BU ≤ 1
(12 − ε)4|U|
B
SV (40)
Then the claim follows from lemma 11, relating BU with P (x∗|u∗) by use of linear programming.
uunionsq
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1. Bounding output probabilities by linear programming
Let us show that for the specific Bell inequality we consider, when the value of the Bell ex-
pression is small there is weak randomness. Consider a four-partite no-signaling box P (x|u) that
obtains a value δ for the Bell expression in Eq. (5). The following lemma shows that for any
measurement setting u, the probability of any outcome x is bounded from above by a function
of δ.
Lemma 11. Consider a four-partite no-signaling box P (x|u) satisfying
B
U
:=
1
|U|B.{P (x|u)} ≤
δ
|U| , (41)
for some δ ≥ 0, with B the indicator vector for the Bell expression in Eq. (5) and |U| = 16 the number of
settings in the Bell expression. For any measurement setting u∗ and any output x∗, we have
P (x∗|u∗) ≤ 1 + 2δ
3
. (42)
Proof. Consider any measurement setting u∗ and any corresponding output x∗ for this setting.
Then P (x∗|u∗) can be computed by the following linear program
P (x∗|u∗) = max
{P}
: MTx∗,u∗{P (x|u)}
s.t. A{P (x|u)} ≤ c. (43)
Here, the indicator vector Mx∗,u∗ is a 24×24 element vector with entriesMx∗,u∗(x,u) = Ix=x∗Iu=u∗ .
The constraint on the box {P (x|u)}written as a vector with 24×24 entries is given by the matrix A
and the vector c. These encode the no-signaling constraints between the four parties, the normal-
ization and the positivity constraints on the probabilities P (x|u). In addition, A and c also encode
the condition that B.{P (x|u)} ≤ δ with δ the bound on the Bell value for the box. Analogous pro-
grams can be formulated for each of the 24 measurement settings appearing in the Bell inequality
in Eq. (5) and each of the 24 corresponding outputs.
The solution to the primal linear program in Eq. (43) can be bounded by any feasible solution
to the dual program which is written as
min
λx∗,u∗
: cTλx∗,u∗
s.t. ATλx∗,u∗ = Mx∗,u∗ ,
λx∗,u∗ ≥ 0. (44)
For each {u∗, x∗}, we find a feasible λx∗,u∗ satisfying the constraints to the dual program above
that gives cTλx∗,u∗ ≤
(
1+2δ
3
)
. We therefore obtain by the duality theorem of linear programming
that
P (x∗|u∗) ≤
(
1 + 2δ
3
)
, (45)
which is the required bound. uunionsq
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C. A min-entropy source from randomness of conditional boxes
In this section we show that if a device is such that a linear number of conditional boxes have
randomness (in the weak sense that the probability of their outputs is bounded away from one),
then the distribution on outputs constitutes a min-entropy source. The considerations in this
section will be applicable to any of the devices j ∈ [k] and any chosen block. Therefore we will
skip the indices for simplicity.
Let any sequence (x1, u1, . . . , xn, un) be such that xi and ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are of the form
of x = (x1, . . . , x4) and u = (u1, . . . ,u4), respectively, both introduced in Subsection II B. We
will show that if, with large probability over sequences (x1, u1, . . . , xn, un), a constant fraction of
those boxes has, for any setting, probability of every output bounded away from 1, then the total
probability distribution is close in variational distance to a min-entropy source (see [22–24] for a
similar result in the context of randomness expansion).
We first prove that, if this happens for all sequences (i.e. with probability 1), then the total box
is a min-entropy source itself and subsequently consider the case when the probability is close
to 1.
Lemma 12. Fix any measure P on the space of sequences (x1, u1, . . . , xn, un). Suppose that for a sequence
(x1, u1, . . . , xn, un), there exists K ⊆ [n] of size larger than µn, such that for all l ∈ K the conditional boxes
Px<l,u<l(xl|ul) satisfy
Px<l,u<l(xl|ul) ≤ γ, . (46)
Then, P (x1, . . . , xn|u1, . . . , un) satisfies
P (x1, . . . , xn|u1, . . . , un) ≤ γµn (47)
Proof. The proof proceeds by successive application of the Bayes rule and the time-ordered no-
signaling structure, i.e.
P (x1, . . . , xn|u1, . . . , un) = P (x1|u1)P (x2|u2, x1, u1)
. . . P (xn|un, xn−1, un−1, . . . , x1, u1), (48)
where we have used the fact that the outputs of the l-th box can depend only upon the inputs and
outputs of the previous boxes due to the time-ordered structure of the boxes (see Eq. (14)). Now,
due to the assumption that at least µn of the conditional boxes Px<l,u<l(xl|ul) satisfy Eq. (46), we
have that
P (x1, . . . , xn|u1, . . . , un) ≤ γµn. (49)
uunionsq
D. Imposing independence between devices by a de Finetti bound with limited randomness
Consider two devices, the first consisting of n boxes and the second consisting of N2 blocks
of n boxes each. In this section, we show that, for suitable choice of N2, the boxes from the first
device are close to being uncorrelated with the boxes in a block chosen from the second device
using an ε-SV source. The lemma is based on the information-theoretic approach of [36, 37] for
proving de Finetti theorems for quantum states and no-signaling distributions.
We denote the box by P (X1, X2≤N2 |U1, U2≤N2), where the superscript denotes the device and the
subscript denotes the block of uses of the device. Capital letters denote the inputs and outputs for
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a set of n boxes so thatX1 = (x11, . . . , x
1
n) andX2≤N2 = (x
2
1,1, . . . , x
2
n,1, . . . , x
2
1,N2
, . . . , x2n,N2) with the
second subscript denoting the block. Note that any x1k or x
2
k,l for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, l ∈ {1, . . . , N2}
are of the form x = (x1, . . . , x4) introduced in Sec. II B. Similarly u1k and u
2
k,l, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} for any
l ∈ {1, . . . , N2} are of the form u = (u1, . . . ,u4).
Lemma 13. Let P (X1, X2≤N2 |U1, U2≤N2) satisfy the no-signaling conditions, i.e. Eqs. (12)-(14), with out-
put and input alphabets Σ and Λ, respectively (i.e. P : Σ×(N2+1)n × Λ×(N2+1)n → R+). The distribution
P represents two devices with the first containing n boxes and the second N2 blocks of n boxes each. Let
A2 ∈ [N2] and (U1, U2≤N2) be chosen from an ε-SV source; we write ν(j, U1, U2≤N2) and the distribution
ν satisfies condition (1). Then, we have
E
(j,U1,U2≤N2 )∼ν
E
X2<j∼P (.|U1,U2≤N2 )
∥∥∥P˜ (X1, X2j |U1, U2j )− P˜ (X1|U1)⊗ P˜ (X2j |U2j )∥∥∥
≤
√
2 ln (2)N
log (1+2ε)
2
n log |Σ|
N2
, (50)
where P˜ is the conditional box given the inputs U2<j and outputs X
2
<j of all prior boxes to the ones in the
j-th block, i.e.
P˜ (X1, X2j |U1, U2j ) := PX2<j ,U2<j (X
1, X2j |U1, U2j ). (51)
Proof. Using the upper bound on mutual information I(A : B) ≤ min(log |A|, log |B|) and the
chain rule I(A : BC) = I(A : B) + I(A : C|B), we have that for every distribution ν
n log |Σ| ≥ E
U1,U2≤N2∼ν
I(X1 : X2≤N2)P (·|U1,U2≤N2 )
= E
U1,U2≤N2∼ν
(
I(X1 : X21 )P (·|U1,U2≤N2 )
+ . . .+ I(X1 : X2N2 |X2<N2)P (·|U1,U2≤N2 )
)
= E
U1,U2≤N2∼ν
Ej∼U(N2)I(X
1 : X2j |X21 , . . . , X2j−1)P (·|U1,U2≤N2 )
= E
U1,U2≤N2∼ν
Ej∼U(N2)I(X
1 : X2j )P˜ (·|U1,U2j ), (52)
where U(N2) is the uniform distribution over the set [N2].
Therefore, if j, U1, U2≤N2 are chosen from an ε-SV source ν, we find
E
(j,U1,U2≤N2 )∼ν
E
X1,X2<j∼P
I(X1 : X2A2)P˜ (·|U1,U2j )
= E
(U1,U2≤N2 )∼ν
E
j∼ν(.|U1,U2≤N2 )
EX1,X2<j∼P I(X
1 : X2A2)P˜ (·|U1,U2j )
≤
(
1
2
+ ε
)logN2
E
(U1,U2≤N2 )∼ν
E
j∼U(N2)
E
X1,X2<j∼P
I(X1 : X2j )P˜ (·|U1,U2j )
≤
(
1
2
+ ε
)logN2
n log |Σ|.
(53)
We now use Pinsker’s inequality relating the mutual information and trace distance for any mea-
sure Q as
I(A : B)Q ≥ 1
2 ln (2)
‖Q(A,B)−Q(A)⊗Q(B)‖2 (54)
with Q := P˜ (·|U1, U2j ), and the convexity of x 7→ x2 to obtain Eq. (50). uunionsq
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FIG. 5: The setup for protocol I.
V. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS OF PROTOCOL I
In Protocol I, the honest parties and Eve share a no-signaling box P (x, z|u′, w), where (x, u′)
denotes the outputs and inputs of all the honest parties for the n runs of the protocol and (z, w)
denotes the output and input of the adversary Eve. The honest parties obtain bits u from the SV
source that will serve as inputs to their box, so u′ will be set to be equal to u. They also draw
further bits t from the SV source to feed together with x into the randomness extractor, obtaining
the final output of the protocol
s = s(x, t). (55)
Eve has classical information e which are bits correlated to u, t. The initial box, describing all
initial variables and inputs is given by
p(x, z, u, t, e|u′, w) (56)
which is a family of probability distributions labelled by u′ and w (we also denote them by
pu′,w(x, z, u, t, e)). The described setup is illustrated in Fig. 5. In notation from Sec. IV C, we
have x = (x1, . . . , xn), u = (u1, . . . , un) where every xk and uk for k ∈ {1, . . . , n} is of the form
x = (x1, x2, x3, x4) and u = (u1,u2,u3,u4), respectively.
Now, referring to notation in Sec. III, for the present protocol, we have sv1 = u, sv2 = t,
svE = e, out = x, in = u′, inE = w, outE = z. The assumptions of Sec. III thus read as follows.
• No-signaling assumptions:
p(x|u′, w) = p(x|u′), (57)
p(z|u′, w) = p(z|w), (58)
p(xj |u′, w, z, u, t, e) = p(xj |u′≤j , w, z, u, t, e) ∀j ∈ [n]. (59)
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• Assumption A1-(I): The devices do not signal to the SV source, i.e. the distribution of
(u, t, e) is independent of the inputs (u′, w):∑
x,z
p(x, z, u, t, e|u′, w) = p(u, t, e) ∀(u, t, e, u′, w). (60)
• Assumption A2-(I): The box is fixed independently of the SV source:
p(x, z|u′, w, u, t, e) = p(x, z|u′, w) ∀(x, z, u, t, e, u′, w). (61)
• SV conditions: The distribution p(u, t, e) satisfies an SV condition (1); in particular, p(t|u, e)
satisfies Eq. (1) too.
After inputting u as u′ (as is done in the protocol) we obtain
pw(x, z, u, t, e) := p(x, z, u, t, e|u,w). (62)
We note that, due to Assmuption A1-(I) (i.e. no-signaling from input u′ to the variable u), it is
a normalized probability distribution for every w.
Now, for
L(x, u) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Bi(xi, ui), (63)
we define the sets ACC and ACCu for acceptance of the protocol as follows
ACC = {(x, u) : L(x, u) ≤ δ}, (64)
and
ACCu = {x : (x, u) ∈ ACC}. (65)
Upon acceptance of the protocol, the family of probability distributions (62) is modified to
pw(x, z, u, t, e|ACC).
To quantify the quality of the output s, we will use the universally composable distance defined
in (22) which in this case reads as
dcomp =
∑
s,e
max
w
∑
z
∣∣∣∣pw(s, z, e|ACC)− 1|S|pw(z, e|ACC)
∣∣∣∣ . (66)
with s given by (55). Here the probability distributions pw(s, z, e|ACC) =
∑
u pw(s, z, u, e|ACC)
are computed from probability distributions (62). Actually, in the proofs we will deal with slightly
modified distance
d˜comp :=
∑
s,e
max
w
∑
z,u
∣∣∣∣pw(s, z, u, e|ACC)− 1|S|pw(z, u, e|ACC)
∣∣∣∣ . (67)
By triangle inequality, we have
dcomp ≤ d˜comp, (68)
hence it is enough to bound d˜comp.
We now define an auxiliary quantity
d′ :=
∑
e
p(e|ACC) max
w
∑
z,u
pw(z, u|e,ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣pw(s|z, u, e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ (69)
for any family of probability distributions {pw(x, z, u, t, e)}.
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Remark 14. In the last two sections we many times use the following, easy to prove, implication
P (a|b, c, d) = P (a|b) ⇒ P (a|b, c, d) = P (a|b, c) = P (a|b, d). (70)
where P is an arbitrary probability measure.
From Assumption A1-(I) and A2-(I), as well as no-signaling assumptions (Eqs. (57)-(59)), we
find that the distributions {pw(x, z, u, t, e)} satisfy:
pw(x, u) = p(x, u) (implied by Eq. (57) and A1-(I)), (71)
pw(u, t, e) = p(u, t, e) (follows from A1-(I)), (72)
∀w pw(x, z|u, t, e) = pw(x, z|u) (follows directly from A2-(I)), (73)
∀w pw(x, z|u, t, e) = pw(x, z|u, e) (follows from A2-(I) and Rem. 14), (74)
pw(x|z, u, t, e) = pz,t,e,w(x|u) is time-ordered no-signaling box (by (59)), (75)
pw(u|z, e) and pw(t|z, u, e) are SV sources (from A2-(I) and SV conditions above). (76)
Remark 15. To be precise, the proof of property (76) goes as follows. We know that p(u, t, e) is an SV
source. Note that
pw(u|z) = pw(u, z)
pw(z)
=
∑
t,e pw(z, u, t, e)
pw(z)
A2-(II) & Eq. (58)
=
pw(z)
∑
t,e pw(u, t, e)
pw(z)
A1-(I)
=
∑
t,e
p(u, t, e) (77)
and hence pw(u|z) is an SV source. Further, we also obtain
pw(t|z, u, e) = pw(z, u, t, e)∑
t pw(z, u, t, e)
A2-(I) & Eq. (58)
=
pw(z)pw(u, t, e)
pw(z)
∑
t pw(u, t, e)
= pw(t|u, e) (78)
and therefore, by the fact that p(t|u, e) satisfies an SV condition (1), the distribution pw(t|z, u, e) also is an
SV source.
For each e, let we denote Eve’s input w and let pwe(x, z, u, t|e) denote the corresponding dis-
tribution that achieves the maximum in Eq.(69). Using the fact that pw(e) = p(e) and that ACC
is a set of (x, u) which obey pw(x, u) = p(x, u) (from Eq.(71)), we see that the distribution that
achieves the maximum takes the form p(e)pwe(x, z, u, t|e). We now set
q(x, z, u, t, e) := p(e)pwe(x, z, u, t|e). (79)
It can be readily seen that this q(x, z, u, t, e) obeys the restrictions:
q(x, z|u, t, e) = q(x, z|u), (80)
q(x, z|u, t, e) = q(x, z|u, e), (81)
q(x|z, u, t, e) = qt,e,z(x|u) is time ordered no-signaling box, (82)
q(u|z, e) and q(t|z, u, e) are SV sources. (83)
We can therefore define
d :=
∑
z,u,e
q(z, u, e|ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|z, u, e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ (84)
and observe that
d = d′. (85)
We now have
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Proposition 16. For any distribution pw(x, z, u, t, e) given by (62) we have
dcomp ≤ |S|d. (86)
Proof. This is a consequence of (68) and the following inequalities
dcomp ≤ d˜comp =
∑
s,e
p(e|ACC) max
w
∑
z,u
pw(z, u|e,ACC)
∣∣∣∣pw(s|u, e, z,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
s,e
p(e|ACC) max
w
∑
s′,z,u
p(z, u|e,ACC)
∣∣∣∣pw(s′|z, u, e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣
≤ |S|
∑
e
p(e|ACC) max
w
∑
s,z,u
pw(z, u|e,ACC)
∣∣∣∣pw(s|z, u, e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣
= |S|d′ (85)= |S|d. (87)
uunionsq
We therefore see that we can effectively work with the distribution q(x, z, u, t, e) and d.
Lemma 17. For any probability distribution q(x, z, u, t, e) satisfying (80)-(83) it follows that
q(x|z, u, t, e, ACC) = q(x|z, u,ACC). (88)
Proof. For (x, u) /∈ ACC the claim holds trivially, since q(x|z, u, t, e, ACC) = q(x|z, u, e, ACC) = 0.
For (x, u) ∈ ACC, we have
q(x|z, u, t, e, ACC) = q(x,ACCu|z, u, t, e)∑
(x,u)∈ACC q(x, u|z, u, t, e)
(89)
=
q(x|z, u, t, e)∑
x∈ACCu q(x|z, u, t, e)
Eq. (80)
=
q(x|z, u)∑
x∈ACCu q(x|z, u)
= q(x|z, u,ACC),
which proves the claim. uunionsq
Lemma 18. Consider the measure q(x, z, u, t, e) satisfying conditions given by (80)-(83). Let δ, δAz > 0
be constants and define the set
AδAz := {(z, u, e) : Pr∼q(x|z,u,e)(L¯ ≥ L+ δAz) ≤ Az}, (90)
where Az := 2e−
1
4
δ2Azn and
L(x, u) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Bi(xi, ui), (91)
L(x, z, u, e) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Eq(xi,ui|x<i,z,u<i,e)Bi(xi, ui). (92)
Let (z, u, e) ∈ AδAz . Then, for arbitrary x ∈ ACCu, we obtain
q(x|z, u, e) ≤ max{Az, γµn}, (93)
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where
µ := 1−
√
δ + δAz, γ =
1
3
(
1 + 2
√
δ + δAz
(12 − )4
)
. (94)
Proof. Let (z, u, e) ∈ AδAz and x ∈ ACCu. We further define two sets:
X
(z,u,e)
good = {x : |L(x, u)− L(x, z, u, e)| ≤ δAz} (95)
and
X
(z,u,e)
bad =
(
X
(z,u,e)
good
)c
. (96)
Note that, for (z, u, e) ∈ AδAz and x ∈ X(z,u,e)bad , we have
Pr∼q(x|z,u,e)(|L(x, u)− L(x, z, u, e)| > δAz) ≤ Az. (97)
Hence, for x ∈ X(z,u,e)bad ,
q(x|z, u, e) ≤ Az. (98)
Let us now analyze the case, when x ∈ X(z,u,e)good . Since x ∈ ACCu, which implies (x, u) ∈ ACC, we
have L(x, u) ≤ δ. Further, for x ∈ X(z,u,e)good , we obtain
L¯(x, z, u, e) ≤ δ + δAz. (99)
Recall that
B¯i = E∼q(xi,ui|x<i,z,u<i,e)(Bi), (100)
where u<i and x<i are the components of u and x respectively. Following Lemma 9, we know
that, for µn positions i, where µ := (1−√δ + δAz), we get
B¯i ≤
√
δ + δAz. (101)
and B¯i plays the role of B¯SV here. Then, by Lemma 10, for µn positions i there holds
qx<i,z,u<i,e(xi|ui) ≤ γ, (102)
for any measurement outcome xi and setting ui. Applying Lemma 12, we get
q(x|z, u, e) ≤ γµn. (103)
Then, due to (98) and (103), the proof is completed. uunionsq
Proposition 19. Given that the probability distribution q(x, z, u, e) satisfies conditions (80)-(83), we have
Pr∼q(z,u,e|ACC)
(
max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) ≤
√
δ1
q(ACC)
)
≥ 1−
√
δ1
q(ACC)
. (104)
where
δ1 = γ
µn + 2Az. (105)
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Proof. Assume first that (z, u, e) ∈ AδAz . We then have
max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) = max
x
q(x,ACC|z, u, e)
q(ACC|z, u, e) (106)
=
maxx∈ACCu q(x|z, u, e)
q(ACC|z, u, e)
Lemma 18≤ max{Az, γ
µn}
q(ACC|z, u, e) . (107)
We now consider∑
z,u,e
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
=
∑
(z,u,e)∈Aδe
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) +
∑
(z,u,e)6∈Aδe
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC).
(108)
We bound the first terms as follows:∑
(z,u,e)∈AδAz
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
Eq. (106)
≤
∑
(z,u,e)∈AδAz
q(z, u, e|ACC)max{Az, γ
µn}
q(ACC|z, u, e)
≤ max{Az, γµn}
∑
(z,u,e)
q(z, u, e)
q(ACC)
=
max{Az, γµn}
q(ACC)
.
(109)
Let us now apply Lemma 7, taking W0 = (e, z), Wi = (xi, ui) for i = 1, . . . , n, and Bi given by (7).
We obtain q(AδAz) ≥ 1− Az . Thus, the second term is bounded as follows∑
(z,u,e)6∈AδAz
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) ≤
∑
(z,u,e)6∈AδAz
q(z, u, e|ACC)
≤
∑
(z,u,e)6∈AδAz
q(z, u, e)
q(ACC)
Lemma 7≤ Az
q(ACC)
. (110)
Altogether we find∑
z,u,e
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) ≤ max{Az, γ
µn}
q(ACC)
+
Az
q(ACC)
≤ γ
µn + 2Az
q(ACC)
.
Applying Markov inequality and setting δ1 = γµn + 2Az completes the proof. uunionsq
The main theorem of this section is the following:
Theorem 20. Suppose we are given  > 0. Set δ > 0 such that
1
3
(
1 + 2
√
2δ
(12 − )4
)
< 1 (111)
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FIG. 6: Trade-off between parameter  of SV source and the amount of tolerated noise δ
(see Fig. 6 trade-off between δ and ). Then for any probability distribution pw(x, z, u, t, e) satisfying Eqs.
(71)-(76) there exists an extractor s(x, t) with |S| = 2Ω(n1/4) values, such that
dcomp · p(ACC) ≤ 2−Ω(n1/4), (112)
where dcomp is given by (66).
Remark 21. Note, that due to first condition of (71), pw(ACC) does not depend on w, hence we could have
written just p(ACC) in the theorem. Moreover, we even have q(ACC) = p(ACC).
Proof. Let δ > 0 satisfying Eq. (111) be given. Set δAz = n−
1
4 so that Az = 2e−
1
4
δ2Azn = 2−Ω(
√
n).
We consider only n ≥ n0 where n0 is such that δAz ≤ δ, i.e. n0 = b 1δ4 c. Then µ ≥ 1 −
√
2δ and
γ < 1. Now, let η =
√
γµn + 2Az , so that η = 2−Ω(
√
n). We shall now consider distribution q given
by (79) and distance d of (84). Suppose first that q(ACC) ≤ η and let us consider
d =
∑
z,u,e
q(z, u, e|ACC)
|S|∑
s=1
∣∣∣∣q(s|z, u, e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣. (113)
Then, since by definition d ≤ 2, we obtain d · q(ACC) ≤ 2−Ω(
√
n). Now, suppose in turn, that
q(ACC) ≥ η. Then, from proposition 19 we get
Pr∼q(z,u,e|ACC)
(
max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) ≤ √η
)
≥ 1−√η. (114)
Take the set Good = {(z, u, e) : maxx q(x|z, u, e,ACC) ≤ √η}. Then for (z, u, e) ∈ Good, we have
Hmin (q(x|z, u, e,ACC)) ≥ c
√
n. (115)
We now consider the total probability distribution q(x, z, u, t, e). From Eq. (81), we have that
conditioned on (z, u, e) the random variables t and x are independent
q(x, t|z, u, e) = q(x|z, u, e)q(t|z, u, e). (116)
Due to Lemma 17, we further obtain
q(x, t|z, u, e,ACC) = q(x|z, u, e,ACC)q(t|z, u, e,ACC) (117)
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Moreover, by assumption (i.e. Eq. (83)) q(t|z, u, e) obeys the SV source conditions. Hence, if we
show that q(t|z, u, e,ACC) = q(t|z, u, e), then q(t|z, u, e,ACC) obeys the SV source conditions as
well. Note that
q(t|z, u, e,ACC) =
∑
x∈ACCu q(t, x|z, u, e)∑
x∈ACCu q(x|z, u, e)
Eq.(116)
= q(t|z, u, e). (118)
Therefore q(t|z, u, e,ACC) is an min-entropy source and we have
Hmin(q(t|z, u, e,ACC)) = c′n (119)
where c′ is a constant depending only on . Thus q(x, t|z, u, e,ACC) is a product of two min-
entropy sources. By the application of extractor of lemma 5 part (i) we obtain the output s with∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|z, u, e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(√n). (120)
For (z, u, e) 6∈ Good, we use∑s ∣∣∣q(s|z, u, e,ACC)− 1|S| ∣∣∣ ≤ 2 and obtain
d ≤
∑
(z,u,e)∈Good
q(z, u, e|ACC)2−Ω(
√
n) +
∑
(z,u,e)6∈Good
2q(z, u, e|ACC)
≤ 2−Ω(
√
n) + 2
1− q(Good)
q(ACC)
Eq. (114)
≤ 2−Ω(
√
n) +
2
√
η
η
= 2−Ω(
√
n) (121)
(recall we have set η = 2−Ω(
√
n)). We thus obtain that
d · q(ACC) ≤ 2−Ω(
√
n) (122)
By definition of q (see also Rem. 21), we have q(ACC) = p(ACC), and from Proposition 16 we
know that dcomp ≤ |S|d. So choosing |S| = 2Ω(n1/4) the claim follows. uunionsq
VI. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS OF PROTOCOL II
Protocol II considers the situation where the honest parties have two no-signaling devices, and
share with the adversary Eve a no-signaling box {p(x, y1, . . . , yN , z|u′, v′1, . . . , v′N , w)}. We work
with the probability distribution p(x, y1, . . . yN , z, u, v1, . . . , vN , t, j, e, u′, v′1, . . . v′N , w). Here we
consider n uses of the first device with u′(= u′1, . . . , u′n) denoting the inputs for these, as well as
N blocks of the second device (each with n uses) with v′1, . . . , v′N denoting the inputs for this
device (note v′k = v′k1 , . . . , v′kn ). The honest parties draw u, v1, . . . , vN as well as the bit strings j
and t from the SV source. The parties input u to the first device (u′ = u) and v1, . . . , vj to the
second device (v′k = vk for k ∈ [j]). They obtain the corresponding outputs x from the first
device, and y1, . . . , yj from the second device. The remaining variables yj+1, . . . , yN we define
to be zero. The adversary Eve holds the bit string e which is her classical information about the
bits drawn from the SV source. Her input is denoted as w with corresponding output z. To avoid
cumbersome notation, we will use the shorthand v′(v) to denote v′1, . . . , v′N (v1, . . . , vN ) as well as
y = y1, . . . , yN where there is no possibility of confusion. Now the initial box describing the initial
variables and inputs is given by p(x, y, z, u, v, t, j, e|u′, v′, w), a family of probability distributions
labeled by u′, v′, w. The final output s of the protocol the honest parties compute as a function of
x, yj and t
s = s(x, yj , t). (123)
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Referring to notation in Sec. III, for the present protocol, we have sv1 = (u, v), sv2 = (t, j),
svE = e, out = (x, y), in = (u′, v′), inE = w, outE = z. The assumptions of Sec. III thus read as
follows.
• No-signaling assumptions:
We have full no-signaling between all parties and devices (see Fig. 7), i.e.
p(x, y|u′, v′, w) = p(x, y|u′, v′) (no-signaling from Eve to honest parties), (124)
p(z|u′, v′, w) = p(z|w) (no-signaling from honest parties to Eve), (125)
p(x, z|u′, v′, w) = p(x, z|u′, w) (126)
p(y, z|u′, v′, w) = p(y, z|v′, w). (127)
We also assume the following time ordered no-signaling conditions (see Fig. 7).
p(xk|u′, v′, w, z, u, v, t, j, e) = p(xk|u′≤k, v′, w, z, u, v, t, j, e) ∀k ∈ [n], (128)
p(yk|u′, v′, w, z, u, v, t, j, e) = p(yk|u′, v′≤k, w, z, u, v, t, j, e) ∀j ∈ [n]. (129)
• Assumption A1-(II): The devices do not signal to the SV source, i.e., the distribution of
(u, v, t, j, e) is independent of the inputs (u′, v′, w):
p(u, v, t, j, e|u′, v′, w) = p(u, v, t, j, e) ∀(u, v, t, j, e, u′, v′, w). (130)
• Assumption A2-(II): The form of the box is fixed independently of the SV source:
p(x, y, z|u′, v′, w, u, v, t, j, e) = p(x, y, z|u′, v′, w) ∀(x, y, z, u, v, t, j, e, u′, v′, w). (131)
• SV conditions: The distribution p(u, v, t, j, e) satisfies an SV condition (1); in particular,
p(t|u, v, j, e) satisfies Eq. (1) too.
Remark 22. Note that
p(x|z, u′, v′, w) = p(x, z|u
′, v′, w)
p(z|u′, v′, w)
Eq.(126)
=
p(x, z|u′, w)
p(z|u′, v′, w)
Eqs.(125),(70)
=
p(x, z|u′, w)
p(z|u′, w) = p(x|z, u
′, w)
(132)
and similary we may show that
p(y|z, u′, v′, w) = p(y|z, v′, w). (133)
After the honest parties input u′ = u, v′ = v in the protocol, we work with the distribution
pw(x, y, z, u, v, t, j, e) := p(x, y, z, u, v, t, j, e|w) (134)
Assumption A1-(II) ensures that this is a normalized probability distribution. The setup is shown
in Figure 7. We will use the further shorthand notation Rj := (y \ yj , v \ vj) and Mj := (Rj , j).
Further, we define the sets of acceptance as follows
ACC1 := {(x, u) : L(x, u) ≤ δ}, (135)
ACCj := {(yj , vj) : L(yj , vj) ≤ δ}, (136)
ACC := ACC1 ∩ACCj , (137)
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FIG. 7: Illustration of the protocol for randomness amplification from two devices (of four no-signaling parts
each) with one block of n runs from the first device and N blocks of n runs from the second one.
where L(x, u) = 1n
∑n
i=1Bi(xi, ui) and L(y
j , vj) = 1n
∑n
i=1Bi(y
j
i , v
j
i ). We also define the u-cut of
the set ACC1 as ACC1u := {x : (x, u) ∈ ACC1} and the vj-cut of the set ACCj as ACCjvj := {yj :
(yj , vj) ∈ ACCj}.
To quantify the quality of the output we will use the universally composable distance defined
in (22), which is of the same form as the distance (66) used in Protocol I
d IIcomp :=
∑
s,e
max
w
∑
z
∣∣∣∣pw(s, z, e|ACC)− 1|S|pw(z, e|ACC)
∣∣∣∣ , (138)
with s given by (123). The probability distribution pw(s, z, e|ACC) is computed from the proba-
bility distributions pw(x, y, z, u, v, t, j, e) given by Eq. (134). Actually, in the proofs we will deal
with slightly modified distance
d˜ IIcomp :=
∑
s,e
max
w
∑
z,u,vj ,Mj
∣∣∣∣pw(s, z, u, vj ,Mj , e|ACC)− 1|S|pw(z, u, vj ,Mj , e|ACC)
∣∣∣∣ , (139)
By triangle inequality, we have
d IIcomp ≤ d˜ IIcomp (140)
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and hence it is enough to bound d˜ IIcomp.
As in Protocol I, we now define the distance quantities d′ and d to see that we can work with
a probability distribution without w. Let us first define the analogous quantity d′II for Protocol II
d′II :=
∑
e
p(e|ACC) max
w
∑
z,u,vj ,Mj
pw(z, u, v
j ,Mj |e,ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣pw(s|z, u, vj ,Mj , e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣
(141)
where pw(s, z, u, vj ,Mj , e|ACC) is computed from any family of probability distributions
{pw(x, y, z, u, v, t, j, e)} satisfying
pw(x, y, u, v) = p(x, y, u, v) (by Eq. (142) and A1-(II)), (142)
pw(u, v, t, j, e) = p(u, v, t, j, e) (follows from A1-(II)), (143)
∀w pw(x, y, z|u, v, t, j, e) = pw(x, y, z|u, v) (follows directly from A2-(II)), (144)
∀w pw(x, y, z|u, v, t, j, e) = pw(x, y, z|u, v, j, e) (by A2-(II) and Rem. 14), (145)
pw(x|z, u, v, t, j, e) = pw(x|z, u, t, j, e) (by A2-(II) and Eq. (132)), (146)
pw(y|z, u, v, t, j, e) = pw(y|z, v, t, j, e) (by A2-(II) and Eq. (133)), (147)
pw(x|z, u, v, t, j, e) = pw,z,v,t,j,e(x|u) and pw(y|z, u, v, t, j, e) = pw,z,u,t,j,e(y|v)
are time-ordered no-signaling (tons) boxes by (128) and (129), (148)
pw(u|z, e), pw(v|z, u, e), pw(j|z, u, v, e) and pw(t|z, u, v, j, e) are SV sources (by A2-(II),
Rem. (14) and SV conditions - the proof goes in the same manner as in Rem. 15). (149)
For each e, let we denote Eve’s input w and let pwe(x, y, z, u, v, t, j|e) denote the corresponding
distribution that achieves the maximum in Eq. (141). Using the fact that pw(e) = p(e) and that
ACC is a set of (x, y, u, v) which obey pw(x, y, u, v) = p(x, y, u, v) (from Eq. (142)), we see that the
distribution that achieves the maximum takes the form p(e)pwe(x, y, z, u, v, t, j|e). We now set
q(x, y, z, u, v, t, j, e) := p(e)pwe(x, y, z, u, v, t, j|e). (150)
It can be readily seen that this q(x, y, z, u, v, t, j, e) obeys the restrictions:
q(x, y, z|u, v, t, j, e) = q(x, y, z|u, v), (151)
q(x, y, z|u, v, t, j, e) = q(x, y, z|u, v, j, e), (152)
q(x|z, u, v, t, j, e) = q(x|z, u, t, j, e) and q(y|z, u, v, t, j, e) = q(y|z, v, t, j, e), (153)
q(x|z, u, v, t, j, e) = qz,v,t,j,e(x|u) and q(y|z, u, v, t, j, e) = qz,u,t,j,e(y|v) are tons boxes, (154)
q(u|z, e), q(v|z, u, e), q(j|z, u, v, e) and q(t|z, u, v, j, e) are SV sources. (155)
We can therefore define
d II :=
∑
z,u,vj ,Mj ,e
q(z, u, vj ,Mj , e|ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|z, u, vj ,Mj , e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ . (156)
and observe that d II = d′II.
As for protocol I, the distance quantity d IIcomp is bounded as in the following proposition.
Proposition 23. For any distribution pw(x, y, z, u, v, t, j, e) given by (134) we have
d IIcomp ≤ |S|d II. (157)
29
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 16 with the substitution u→ (u, vjMj). uunionsq
We therefore see that we can effectively work with the distribution q(x, y, z, u, v, t, j, e) and d II.
We now define the set AδAz for which Azuma estimation works, as follows
AδAz ,1 = {(z, u, vj ,Mj , e) : Pr∼q(x|z,u,vj ,Mj ,e)
(
L(x, z, u,Mj , e) ≤ L(x, u) + δAz
) ≥ 1− Az},
AδAz ,j = {(z, u, vj ,Mj , e) : Pr∼q(yj |z,u,vj ,Mj ,e)
(
L(yj , z, vj ,Mj , e) ≤ L(yj , vj) + δAz
) ≥ 1− Az},
AδAz = AδAz ,1 ∩AδAz ,j , (158)
where Az := 2e−
1
4
δ2Azn and L is of the form
L(x, z, u,Mj , e) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E∼q(xi,ui|x<i,z,u<i,Mj ,e)Bi(xi, ui), (159)
L(yj , z, vj ,Mj , e) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E∼q(yji ,vji |z,yj<i,vj<i,Mj ,e)Bi(y
j
i , v
j
i ), (160)
where ui and v
j
i are distributed according to the measure ν from an SV source. Further, we define
Sξ = {(z, u, vj ,Mj , e) : Pr∼q(x,yj |z,u,vj ,Mj ,e)(ACC) ≥ ξ}. (161)
and
DdeF := {(z, u, vj ,Mj , e) : ‖q(x, yj |z, u, vj ,Mj , e)−q(x|z, u, vj ,Mj , e)⊗q(yj |z, u, vj ,Mj , e)‖ ≤ deF }.
(162)
We note that for any fixed Mj , the boxes corresponding to both blocks q(x|z, u,Mj , e) and
q(yj |z, vj ,Mj , e) are valid time ordered no-signaling boxes, as it was in the single device scenario.
Indeed, for the first quantity we have
q(x|z, u,Mj , e) = q(x|z, y \ yj , u, v \ vj , j, e) = q(x|z, y<j , u, v \ vj , j, e), (163)
where we use yk = 0 for k > j and in this distribution the inputs and outputs of the second device
(that does not signal to the first) v \ vj and y<j are just labels for the distribution.
Regarding the second device, we have
q(yj |z, vj ,Mj , e) = q(yj |y \ yj , z, vj , v \ vj , j, e) = q(yj |y<j , z, vj , v \ vj , j, e), (164)
where we used the fact that yk = 0 for k > j. Due to the assumption that, conditioned on the
past, the box is still time-ordered no-signaling and because v>j are just random variables from SV
source, we have again that the latter distribution is a time-ordered no-signaling box and v \ vj ,
y<j and j, z, e are just labels. We now observe the analogue of Lemma 18.
Proposition 24. Consider the measure q(x, yj , z, u, vj ,Mj , e) satisfying conditions (151)-(155). Let
δ, δAz > 0 be constants and let (z, u, vj ,Mj , e) ∈ AδAz . Then, for arbitrary x ∈ ACC1u, we have
q(x|z, u,Mj , e) ≤ max{γµn, Az}, (165)
and for arbitrary yj ∈ ACCj
vj
,
q(yj |z, vj ,Mj , e) ≤ max{γµn, Az}, (166)
where
µ := 1−
√
δ + δAz, γ =
1
3
(
1 + 2
√
δ + δAz
(12 − )4
)
. (167)
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Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 18 with the direct substitution u → (u, vj ,Mj)
and noting that, by no-signaling (i.e. Eq. (153)) and Rem. 14, we have q(yj |z, u, vj ,Mj , e) =
q(yj |z, vj ,Mj , e) and q(x|z, u, vj ,Mj , e) = q(x|z, u,Mj , e). uunionsq
We now also have the analogue of Proposition 19.
Proposition 25. Fix arbitrary δ, δAz > 0 and consider the measure q(x, yj , z, u, vj ,Mj , e) that satisfies
conditions (151)-(155). We have
Pr∼q(z,u,vj ,Mj ,e|ACC1)
(
max
x
q(x|z, u, vj ,Mj , e,ACC1) ≤
√
δ1
q(ACC1)
)
≥ 1−
√
δ1
q(ACC1)
, (168)
Pr∼q(z,u,vj ,Mj ,e|ACCj)
(
max
yj
q(yj |z, u, vj ,Mj , e,ACCj) ≤
√
δ1
q(ACCj)
)
≥ 1−
√
δ1
q(ACCj)
, (169)
where
q(ACC1) = Pr∼q(x,z,u,vj ,Mj ,e)(ACC
1), q(ACCj) = Pr∼q(yj ,z,u,vj ,Mj ,e)(ACC
j) (170)
and
δ1 = γ
µn + 2Az. (171)
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Prop. 19 if we substitute u→ (u, vjMj) and ACC→ ACC1
for Eq.(168) and ACC → ACCj for Eq.(169). We also use Lemma 7 with Wi = (ui, xi) for i ≥ 1
and W0 = (z, vj ,Mj , e) for Eq.(168), and with Wi = (v
j
i , y
j
i ) for i ≥ 1 and W0 = (z, u,Mj , e), for
Eq.(169). uunionsq
Here we shall prove a proposition that has no analogue in the security proof for Protocol I. It
says that, if the original distribution is close to product (due to our deFinetti-type result), then
also the distribution conditioned upon acceptance will be close to product of distributions.
Proposition 26. For arbitrary deF > 0, ξ ≥ 2deF and M ≡ (z, u, vj ,Mj , e) ∈ Sξ suppose∥∥∥∥q(x, yj |M)− q(x|M)⊗ q(yj |M)∥∥∥∥ ≤ deF . (172)
Then we have ∥∥∥∥q(x, yj |M,ACC)− q(x|M,ACC1)⊗ q(yj |M,ACCj)∥∥∥∥ ≤ 3deFξ2 . (173)
Proof. Since ACC = ACC1 ∩ACCj , Eq. (172) implies∣∣q(ACC|M)− q(ACC1|M)q(ACCj |M)∣∣ ≤ deF . (174)
Hence ∥∥∥∥q(x, yj |M,ACC)− q(x|M,ACC1)⊗ q(yj |M,ACCj)∥∥∥∥
≤ max±
∥∥∥∥q(x, yj ,ACC|M)q(ACC|M) − q(x,ACC1|M)⊗ q(yj ,ACCj |M)q(ACC|M)(1± κ)
∥∥∥∥ (175)
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where κ = deFq(ACC|M) . For M ≡ (z, u, vj ,Mj , e) ∈ Sξ, we have by definition of Sξ in Eq. (161)
that q(ACC|M) ≥ ξ, so that κ ≤ deFξ ≤ 12 for ξ ≥ 2deF . Sandwiching the above with
q(x,ACC1|M)⊗q(yj ,ACCj |M)
q(ACC|M) and using triangle inequality we get∥∥∥∥q(x, yj |M,ACC)− q(x|M,ACC1)⊗ q(yj |M,ACCj)∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥q(x, yj ,ACC|M)q(ACC|M) − q(x,ACC1|M)⊗ q(yj ,ACCj |M)q(ACC|M)
∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥q(x,ACC1|M)⊗ q(yj ,ACCj |M)q(ACC|M)
(
1− 1
1± κ
)∥∥∥∥ (176)
Now we can bound the first term on the right hand side of Eq. (176) as follows∥∥∥∥q(x, yj ,ACC|M)q(ACC|M) − q(x,ACC1|M)⊗ q(yj ,ACCj |M)q(ACC|M)
∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
q(ACC|M)
∥∥q(x, yj |M)− q(x|M)⊗ q(yj |M)∥∥ Eq. (172)≤ deF
q(ACC|M) , (177)
since projecting onto ACC is a trace non-increasing channel and hence cannot increase trace norm.
The second term on the right hand side of Eq. (176) is simply bounded as∥∥∥∥q(x,ACC1|M)⊗ q(yj ,ACCj |M)q(ACC|M)
(
1− 1
1± κ
)∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1q(ACC|M)
∣∣∣∣ κ1− κ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2κq(ACC|M) , (178)
where κ ≤ deFξ ≤ 12 . Inserting these into (176) and using 1 ≥ q(ACC|M) ≥ ξ for M ∈ Sξ, we get∥∥∥∥q(x, yj |M,ACC)− q(x|M,ACC1)⊗ q(yj |M,ACCj)∥∥∥∥ ≤ 3deFξ2 . (179)
uunionsq
Now we will combine Prop. 25 which gives that from device 1 and device 2 we obtain prob-
ability distributions with upper bounded maximal probability and Prop. 26 which says that the
joint probability distribution is close to a product distribution.
Theorem 27. Suppose we are given  > 0. Set δ > 0 such that
1
3
(
1 + 2
√
2δ
(12 − )4
)
< 1 (180)
(see Fig. 6 trade-off between δ and ). Then for arbitrary family of probability distributions
pw(x, y, z, u, v, t, j, e) satisfying conditions (142)-(149) there exists an extractor s(x, yj , t) with |S| = 2nc
values for a constant c > 0 (depending on ) such that
d IIcomp · p(ACC) ≤ 2−n
Ω(1)
. (181)
where d IIcomp is given by (138).
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Remark 28. Note, that due to (142), pw(ACC) does not depend on w, hence we wrote just p(ACC) in the
theorem. Moreover, we even have q(ACC) = p(ACC).
Proof. Set M = (z, u, vj ,Mj , e) and the probability distribution q given by (150). Let us consider
d II, as in Eq. (156),
d II =
∑
M
q(M |ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|M,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣
=
∑
M 6∈DdeF
q(M |ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|M,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
M∈Sξ∩DdeF
q(M |ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|M,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣
+
∑
M∈(Sξ)c∩DdeF
q(M |ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|M,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣
(182)
We consider the three terms separately. Let us consider the first term with M 6∈ DdeF . By Eq. (50)
from Lemma 13, we know that
EM∼q(M)‖q(x, yj |M)− q(x|M)⊗ q(yj |M)‖ ≤ 2deF , (183)
where 2deF = c
√
nN
1
2
log( 1
2
+) and c is an absolute constant. Applying Markov inequality to the
above, we get that
Pr
q(M)
(‖q(x, yj |M)− q(x|M)⊗ q(yj |M)‖ ≤ deF ) ≥ 1− deF , (184)
so that q(DdeF ) ≥ 1− deF . We therefore have, using
∑
s
∣∣∣q(s|M,ACC)− 1|S| ∣∣∣ ≤ 2, that
∑
M 6∈DdeF
q(M |ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|M,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 ∑
M 6∈DdeF
q(M,ACC)
q(ACC)
≤ 2
∑
M 6∈DdeF
q(M)
q(ACC)
≤ 2deF
q(ACC)
. (185)
Consider now the second term with M ∈ Sξ ∩DdeF . Proposition 25 implies that with probability
1−
√
γµn + 2Az
q(ACC1)
−
√
γµn + 2Az
q(ACC2)
≥ 1− 2
√
γµn + 2Az
q(ACC)
(186)
we have that for h := 12 [log(γ
µn + 2Az) + log q(ACC)],
Hmin(q(x|M,ACC1)) ≥ h and Hmin(q(yj |M,ACCj)) ≥ h. (187)
Moreover, by condition (154) and (152) (i.e. q(t|x, y, z, u, v, j, e) = q(t|z, u, v, j, e)), we obtain that
q(t|M,ACC) also satisfies the SV source conditions, i.e., Hmin(q(t|M,ACC)) ≥ cn for some con-
stant c depending on ε. By Lemma 5 part (ii), there exists an extractor that extracts Θ(h) bits
s = s(x, yj , t). Let us denote the action of extractor by Extr. The extractor acts on
q(x, yj , t|M,ACC) = q(t|M,ACC)⊗ q(x, yj |M,ACC) (188)
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producing the output s with distribution q(s|M,ACC) and so
Extr
(
q(x, yj , t|M,ACC)) ≡ q(s|M,ACC). (189)
The action of the extractor on an ideal product distribution produces an output with some distri-
bution which we denote q¯(s|M)
Extr
(
q(t|M,ACC)⊗ q(x|M,ACC1)⊗ q(yj |M,ACCj)) ≡ q¯(s|M) (190)
From Lemma 5 part (ii), we know that∑
s
∣∣∣∣q¯(s|M)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−hΩ(1) , (191)
with |S| = 2Θ(h). Since M ∈ DdeF , by Prop. 26 we have that for M ∈ Sξ
‖q(x, yj |M,ACC)− q(x|M,ACC1)⊗ q(yj |M,ACCj)‖ ≤ 3deF
ξ2
, (192)
so that, using Eq. (188), we have
‖q(t, x, yj |M,ACC)− q(t|M,ACC)⊗ q(x|M,ACC1)⊗ q(yj |M,ACCj)‖ ≤ 3deF
ξ2
. (193)
Hence, according to monotonicity of trace norm and Eq. (190) we obtain
‖q(s|M,ACC)− q¯(s|M)‖ ≤ 3deF
ξ2
(194)
Thus, by using (191) and (194) and applying triangle inequality we get∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|M,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−hΩ(1) + 3deFξ2 (195)
and therefore the second term in Eq. (182) is estimated as follows∑
M∈Sξ∩DdeF
q(M |ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|M,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−hΩ(1) + 3deFξ2 . (196)
Now, we deal with the third term, i.e. with M ∈ (Sξ)c ∩ DdeF . For M ∈ (Sξ)c we have that
q(ACC|M) ≤ ξ. Using∑s ∣∣∣q(s|M,ACC)− 1|S| ∣∣∣ ≤ 2, we obtain∑
M∈(Sξ)c∩DdeF
q(M |ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|MACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 ∑
M∈(Sξ)c∩DdeF
q(M |ACC)
≤ 2
∑
M∈(Sξ)c∩DdeF
q(M)q(ACC|M)
q(ACC)
≤ 2ξ
q(ACC)
(197)
Inserting (185), (197) and (196) into (182), we obtain
d II ≤ 2deF
q(ACC)
+ 2−h
Ω(1)
+
3deF
ξ2
+
2ξ
q(ACC)
, (198)
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where ξ is an arbitrary number satisfying ξ ≥ 2deF (as in proposition 26), and h =
1
2 [log(γ
µn + 2Az) + log q(ACC)]. We now analyze the product d II · p(ACC).
As in the case of Protocol I, we set δAz = n−
1
4 so that Az = 2e−
1
4
δ2en = 2−Ω(
√
n). We consider
only n ≥ n0 where n0 is such that δe ≤ δ (i.e. n0 = b 1δ4 c). Then µ ≥ 1 −
√
2δ and γ < 1. Now, let
η =
√
γµn + 2Az , so that η = 2−Ω(
√
n). Suppose first that q(ACC) ≤ η then since d II ≤ 2, we have
d II · q(ACC) ≤ 2η. Suppose now, that q(ACC) ≥ η. Then setting ξ = η2, we get 2h = 2Ω(
√
n) and,
using (198), we obtain
d II ≤ 2−nΩ(1) + 5deF
η4
+ 2η. (199)
Finally, recall that, due to Lemma 13, 2deF = c
√
nN
1
2
log( 1
2
+) where c is absolute constant. Setting
the number of blocks N = 2n so that 2deF = 2
−Ω(n), we obtain
d II ≤ 2−nΩ(1) . (200)
so that
d II · q(ACC) ≤ 2−nΩ(1) . (201)
By definition of q and Rem. 28, we have q(ACC) = p(ACC) and from Prop. 23 we know that
d IIcomp ≤ |S|d II. We then see that there exists some constant c > 0 such that setting |S| = 2n
c
, we
get d IIcomp · p(ACC) ≤ 2−n
Ω(1)
. This completes the proof. uunionsq
VII. CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We presented a protocol for obtaining secure random bits from an arbitrarily (but not fully de-
terministic) Santha-Vazirani source. The protocol uses a finite number (as few as four for the Bell
inequality considered here) of no-signaling devices, and works even with correlations attainable
by noisy quantum mechanical resources. Moreover the correctness of the protocol is not based on
quantum mechanics and only requires the no-signaling principle.
We leave the following open questions to future research:
• Is there an efficient protocol for device-independent randomness amplification with a con-
stant number of devices, and tolerating a constant rate of noise, whose correctnesses only
assume limited independence between the source and the devices?
• Does Protocol I and II work even for a public SV source (in which the bits are drawn from
the source and communicated to all the parties)?
• Is there a bipartite Bell inequality with the property that it is algebraically violated by quan-
tum correlations, and for all settings in the Bell expression, the probabilities of the outputs
are bounded away from one? Our protocol could be applied with such a Bell expression
with a significant reduction in the number of no-signaling devices required.
• Is there a protocol that can tolerate a higher level of noise? What if we assume the validity
of quantum mechanics?
• Can we amplify randomness with only a finite number of devices from other different types
of sources? A particularly interesting case is the min-entropy source [12, 16, 17].
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• A more technical question is to improve the de Finetti theorem given in [36, 37]. What are
the limits of de Finetti type results when the subsystems are selected from a Santha-Vazirani
source?
• Finally suppose one would like to realize device-independent quantum key distribution
with only an imperfect SV source as the randomness source. Is there an efficient protocol
for this task tolerating a constant rate of noise and gives a constant rate of key? Here the
question is open for both quantum-mechanical and no-signaling adversaries.
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